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The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University is proud to be home of the Lake 
Institute on Faith & Giving. The Lake Institute provides a unique public forum for 
exploring the connections between individual philanthropy and faith while fostering 
a greater understanding of the ways in which faith both inspires and informs giving. 
In addition, scholars contribute to research on the role religion plays in philanthropy 
and other philanthropic issues relevant to churches, communities and nonprofit 
organizations.
 Among the Institute’s exemplary programs is the annual Thomas H. Lake 
Lecture, named for Thomas Lake, a man of deep religious faith and philanthropic 
generosity. In his personal and business life, Mr. Lake was dedicated to bringing 
about community change for the common and social good via faith and charitable 
giving. Through this lecture in his name, we engage the community in thoughtful 
discussion on philanthropy and religion. The Lake Institute on Faith & Giving was 
established as the result of the generous legacy of Tom and Marjorie Lake and their 
daughter, Karen, to Indiana University. 
 Rabbi Elliot Dorff, Ph.D., who gave the Institute’s sixth annual lecture, is a 
national expert on issues of Jewish theology, law and ethics, especially in the medical 
sciences, having served on the Ethics Committee of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 
Health Care Task Force in 1993. Currently, Rabbi Dorff is Rector and Distinguished 
Professor of Philosophy at American Jewish University.
 In his lecture, Rabbi Dorff examines the ethical conundrum of nonprofit 
institutions receiving gifts from ill-gotten gains and addresses it from the perspective 
a Jewish legal case study. Institutions generally do not seek out funding from sources of 
ill-repute, but what happens when a gift received in good faith is later discovered to 
have been tainted? This lecture provides nonprofit professionals, as well as armchair 
attorneys and those interested in religion’s role in today’s society, a scholarly and also 
practical way to evaluate contributions and donors of ill-gotten gain. 
Patrick Rooney
Executive Director
The Center on Philanthropy
September 2009
Donations from Ill-Gotten Gain
The Jewish tradition uses many resources to resolve moral dilemmas, to teach 
moral norms, and to motivate moral behavior. These include stories, proverbs, 
history, theology, modeling, study, and law. Although all of these aspects of 
Judaism can be and are used to determine what morality demands, to teach 
morality, and to motivate moral behavior, law is the principal way in which the 
Jewish tradition seeks to resolve moral conundrums. Like every other mechanism 
used for these moral purposes, law has some significant disadvantages as well as 
some clear advantages in accomplishing these ends.2    
 Like Anglo-American law and unlike European Continental law, Jewish 
law works primarily through cases, in which judges respond to a specific set of 
circumstances and then their ruling can be used to inform later courts as to how to 
rule in similar cases. (Continental law instead works deductively from codes.) On 
hard cases, rabbis will describe the situation to another rabbi with known expertise 
in the relevant area of the law, and that rabbi will respond with a judicial ruling. 
This literature is called, in Hebrew, she’ailot u’teshuvot (“questions and answers”), 
or, in English, the responsa literature (singular, responsum).  
 So to illustrate how the Jewish tradition deals with moral questions, I will 
present here an actual case that I was asked to rule on some six months ago. An 
earlier draft has been discussed once by the Conservative Movement’s Committee 
I would like to thank the members of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, the people who 
heard and commented on an earlier draft of this at the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University in 
Indianapolis, especially Professor Robert Katz, and Rabbi Elie Spitz’s adult study group – most especially 
Dr. Neil Spingarn, who sent me a detailed memo of five important comments after my session with that 
group – for their insightful questions, comments, and suggestions on earlier drafts of this responsum.
2 I discuss how Judaism uses all of these resources to address moral questions as well as the advantages 
and disadvantages of using law for this purpose in my book, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself: A Jewish 
Approach to Modern Personal Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003), Appendix, pp. 311-344.
on Jewish Law and Standards, and this draft will be discussed and probably voted 
on at the next meeting of the Committee in June 2009. Hopefully my ruling will be 
interesting and informative not only on the specific issue discussed, but also as an 
illustration of how one religious tradition grapples with hard moral dilemmas.  
 
The Situation: 
 Mr. and Mrs. Jones (not their real family name) send their children to 
Camp Ramah and have become very friendly with the Ramah community, to the 
extent that Mrs. Jones is on the Ramah Board. Several years ago they donated 
money to Ramah. It was used primarily to build a facility at camp that bears 
their family name, but there is still some money left over for Ramah to use for 
other purposes. Mr. Jones was just indicted by a grand jury for money laundering 
and stock fraud, and the cover story in the local Jewish newspaper described the 
indictment in great detail. Their synagogue’s rabbi gave a sermon on the Shabbat 
following the indictment denouncing Mr. Jones and announcing that the facility 
that they had donated to the synagogue in the Jones family name would no longer 
bear their name.
 Because this case arose at a Ramah camp, I will use Ramah as my example 
throughout this responsum. Its reasoning and conclusions, however, apply equally 
to any Jewish communal institution – synagogues, schools, federations, social 
service agencies, and national and international organizations like the United 
Synagogue of Conservative Judaism and the Rabbinical Assembly.
Questions (She’ailot):
 1) May or should Camp Ramah treat Mr. Jones as if he were already
  convicted of the crime of which he is accused after he is indicted but
  before he is convicted? 
 2) If Mr. Jones is convicted of the crime of which he is accused, may or
  should Camp Ramah remove the Jones family name from the facility that
  they donated? What if the facility had been named for Mr. Jones alone?
 3) Must Camp Ramah use money it has raised from other sources to return
  to the Jones family the amount of money they donated if it has already
  been used to build the building in their name?
 4) Must Camp Ramah return the money the Jones family donated that has
  not yet been used?
 5) May Camp Ramah accept any further donations from Mr. Jones?  
 6) May Camp Ramah accept any further donations from the Jones family?
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Response (teshuvah): 
 
Defining “Ill-Gotten Gain”
 This case, in one important way, is easier to address as a matter of law than 
it might be. Specifically, in this case Mr. Jones was indicted and later convicted 
of felonies that affected the money he donated to Ramah. Sometimes, though, 
nonprofits are faced with much stickier problems, in which the donor obtained the 
money donated in ways that were legal but less than honorable. What happens then?
 Jewish Family Service of Los Angeles (JFS) was faced with this when 
the Philip Morris Company offered to donate money to one of its programs on 
condition that Philip Morris be allowed to advertise that it supported JFS. The 
JFS Board ultimately accepted the money on the grounds that Philip Morris had 
become a conglomerate that at the time included Kraft Cheese and a number of 
other products that are not addictive, and so the $10,000 it was donating might 
well have come from money it earned on products other than cigarettes. The JFS 
Board stipulated, however, that the company may not advertise the donation 
because the company’s name was still associated in the public mind primarily 
with cigarettes. Cigarettes are, after all, legal, but JFS runs drug and alcohol 
abuse programs, and cigarettes are equally addictive. The company’s product thus 
undermines one of the goals of the JFS mission. 
 In the discussion, however, one of the Board members, a major contributor 
to the agency, noted that he earns his money by importing clothes from Asia. He 
does his best to make sure that employees there work in reasonable conditions, 
but he has limited control over that, and he knows that Americans would call the 
places where the workers manufacture the clothing “sweatshops.” “So should JFS 
refuse my money?” he asked. That is, morally tainted money is not necessarily 
illegally earned.3    
 Because the case that motivated the writing of this responsum concerns 
money that was legally as well as morally tainted, my treatment of it in what 
3
3 When I presented this responsum in an earlier draft as the Lake Lecture at the Center on Philanthropy at 
Indiana University, Dr. Eugene Tempel suggested a number of other cases where money was legally earned but 
morally tainted. He pointed out, for example, that Stanford University accepted $100 million from Exxon 
for a research project, but then one donor cancelled his $2.5 million gift because the Exxon gift, in his view, 
undermined his environmental concerns. Master P, a gangster rapper making $50 million a year, contributed 
substantially to the New Orleans Catholic school in which he had been a student (St. Monica Elementary 
School). The lyrics of Master P’s rap music degrade others, but if the archdiocese refused the gift, the school, 
which now serves many disadvantaged children from broken homes, would have to close. The archdiocese 
asked two moral philosophers what they should do. They told the archdiocese that it could accept the money 
because it was coming from his clothing and professional sports investments, not from his music, and, in any 
case, Master P was only his stage persona and not the real person who was donating the money. As discussed 
below, this sounds like many of the distinctions that Jewish law makes.
follows will not deal in detail with moral concerns that may lead a nonprofit to 
refuse a potential donor’s gift. I will say, though, that once one enters the domain 
of legally ill-gotten gain, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to draw any 
bright lines that would distinguish gifts from sources that are morally acceptable 
from those that are not. That is true as well for violations of Jewish ritual law; 
indeed, no Jewish organization I know of, including ultra-Orthodox ones, 
refuse gifts from people who violate, for example, the dietary or Sabbath laws. 
Furthermore, as we will see below, nonprofits may and should presume that the 
money being offered to them is legitimately and morally earned until and unless the 
donor is a “well-known thief” (a ganav mefursam), at which point the burden of 
proof shifts and the nonprofit must investigate the source of the money proffered. 
Normally, though, nonprofits need not investigate the sources of potential gifts.  
On the other hand, nonprofits depend for their support on the trust of others, 
and if a gift undermines an agency’s integrity, it may be unwise to accept it. The 
decision of a nonprofit to refuse a gift on moral grounds or because it conflicts 
with its best interests, however, must be an ad hoc one, based on the mission of the 
nonprofit and the specific circumstances of the gift.
       
Between Indictment and Conviction
 At the moment, Mr. Jones is indicted but not convicted. Jewish law is even 
more insistent than American law that a person is innocent until proven guilty: in 
American law, one may confess to both civil and criminal liability, but in Jewish 
law one may confess to civil liability (hoda’at ba’al din k’me’ah edim dami)4  but 
not to culpability for a crime, for “one may not make oneself a wicked person” 
(ain adam masim atzmo rasha).5 In both systems of law, courts must presume 
innocence.6 Thus, during the time between the indictment and the court verdict, 
rabbis need to inform anyone who asks about this case that the strong presumption 
4 B. Gittin 40a, 64b; B. Kiddushin 65b; B. Bava Metzia 3b. In this and all other footnotes, M. = Mishnah 
(edited by Rabbi Yehudah, President of the Sanhedrin, c. 200 C.E.), B. =  Babylonian Talmud (edited by Ravina 
and Rav Ashi, c. 500 C.E.), M.T. = Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah (completed c. 1177 C.E.), S.A. =  Joseph 
Caro’s Shulhan Arukh (completed c. 1565 C.E., and usually published with glosses by Rabbi Moses Isserles to 
indicate where Northern European [Ashkenazic] practices differed from those of Mediterranean [Sephardic] 
Jewry, as reflect in Caro’s work.
5 B. Yevamot 25b; B. Ketubbot 18b; B. Sanhedrin 9b, 25a. For an extensive treatment of this topic, see Aaron 
Kirschenbaum, Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law (New York: Burning Bush Press, 1970). 
6 Yehudah ben Tabbai says that judges should see the litigants standing before them as all guilty, and only after 
the verdict should judges see the litigants as innocent, “for they have accepted the judgment” (M. Avot 1:8), 
but that is probably advice to judges to be skeptical of what litigants say rather than an assertion of their legal 
guilt. After all, Jewish law establishes much stricter rules of evidence to establish guilt than American law does, 
requiring two witnesses who are unrelated to the accused, to the litigants, or to each other, banning hearsay 
evidence, etc. 
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of innocence in Jewish law requires everyone to think and act accordingly; failure 
to do so is a violation of the prohibition to slander others (motzi shem ra).7   
After Conviction: Removing the Name of the Jones Family 
or Mr. Jones from the Jones Building
 Suppose, however, that Mr. Jones is convicted of the crimes of which 
he is accused, either through a confession on his part (perhaps as part of a plea 
agreement) or through a formal trial. May – or should – Ramah remove the family 
name from the building the Jones Family donated the money to construct?  
 First, although the ladder of levels of tzedakah (charity), articulated first 
by Maimonides (Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, 1135-1204, Spain and Egypt) and 
repeated in the Shulhan Arukh by Rabbi Joseph Caro (1488-1575, Spain and 
Israel), much prefers that gifts be given anonymously, that applies to donations to 
poor people who might well be embarrassed to be in need of such gifts.8 It does not 
apply to institutions, where Jewish law specifically permits named facilities “so that 
he [the donor] will be remembered… and it is fitting to do this.”9    
 Should, though, a name be removed if the donor is convicted of a felony?  
Even though a pervasive principle in the Talmud is that we should not reward a 
sinner (shelo yeheh hoteh niskar),10 even more important, in my view, is the equally 
pervasive Talmudic principle that we must uphold people’s honor11 and, conversely, 
avoid embarrassing them. This especially applies to innocent people and to public 
embarrassment. Indeed, the Talmud compares one who embarrasses people in 
public to a murderer,12 and it denies a place in the World to Come to someone who 
embarrasses another in public.13   
 Because the Jones children are part of the Ramah family and are enrolled 
for the upcoming summer, avoiding embarrassment for them must be a prime 
concern in deciding whether the family name should be removed from the facility 
by which it has been known for several summers. The children, after all, are 
5
7 M.T. Laws of Ethics (De’ot) 7:2-3.
8 M.T. Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:7-14; S.A. Yoreh De’ah 249:6-13.
9 S.A. Yoreh De’ah 249:13, gloss, based on responsum #582 of the Rashba. I would like to thank Rabbi Daniel 
Nevins for pointing out this aspect of the situation and this source. 
10 B. Ketubbot 11a, 36b, 39b; B. Sotah 15a; B. Gittin 55b; B. Bava Kamma 39a; B. Menahot 6a, 6b; B. Niddah 
4b. See also the following passages, in which the prospect of a sinner being rewarded serves as an objection to 
a possible ruling: B. Yevamot 92b; B. Bava Kamma 38a; B. Avodah Zarah 2b.
11 B. Berakhot 19b; B. Shabbat 81b, 94b; B. Eruvin 41b; B. Megillah 3b; B. Bava Kamma 79b; B. Menahot 
37b, 38a. For a detailed discussion of this principle, see the responsum by Rabbis Daniel Nevins, Avram 
Reisner, and me, “Homosexuality, Human Dignity, and Halakhah,” Section IV (that section was primarily 
written by Rabbi Nevins) at www.rabbinicalassembly.org under the link “Contemporary Halakhah.” 
12 B. Bava Kamma 58b.
13 B. Sanhedrin 107a.
innocent of any crime, and we should not harm them any more than they have 
already been hurt by what their father has been convicted of doing.  
 Indeed, the Jewish community should not embarrass Mr. Jones himself any 
more than his conviction already has. Thus in his sermon’s public denunciation 
of the Jones family, their synagogue’s rabbi clearly transgressed Jewish law, for 
he thereby subjected Mr. Jones and his family to shame in front of the entire 
congregation. Mr. Jones at that time was only indicted, not convicted, and that 
makes the rabbi’s actions even worse; but even if the rabbi spoke after Mr. Jones 
had been convicted, his family is innocent and should certainly not have been 
subjected to public humiliation. Furthermore, it is not the role of the rabbi to 
shame Mr. Jones beyond what his sentence already involves. In fact, Jewish law 
requires that one who embarrasses another pay damages for the shame (boshet) 
involved,14 and so Mr. Jones’ family, and perhaps even Mr. Jones himself, may 
actually have a legal remedy against the rabbi who acted as he did. For the same 
reasons, even if Mr. Jones is convicted, Ramah should not on its own initiative 
remove the family name for fear of causing further embarrassment to both him and 
his family. Indeed, the Mishnah specifically allows a community to honor someone 
with a moral cloud over his head:
 Similarly, if an [accidental] killer was exiled to a city of refuge and 
 the people of the city wanted to honor him, he should say to them, 
 “I am a killer.” If they say to him, “Even so [we want to honor you,]” 
 he may accept [the honor] from them, as the Torah says (Deuteronomy
 19:4), “This is the word of the killer” [where “word” is in the singular,
 suggesting that the killer need only tell them once and need not repeat 
 his announcement of his tainted moral status].15 
 Furthermore, Ramah needs to check the agreement that it made with the 
Jones family before even considering whether to remove their name from the 
facility built with their funds. If they specifically donated money on condition that 
it be used for this facility and that it be named for them, and if Ramah accepted 
these conditions, Ramah has no right to remove it, either in civil law or in Jewish 
law.16  Ramah may be legally entitled to return all of the Jones family money and 
then remove the name, but without stipulation of reasons to remove the family 
name in Ramah’s contract with the Jones family, even this is questionable.     
 The only condition under which the Jones family name may and should 
be removed from the facility they donated the money to construct is if the family 
14  M. Bava Kamma 8:1, 6; B. Bava Kamma 83b, 86b.
15 M. Shevi’it 10:8; M. Makkot 2:8. I would like to thank Rabbi Daniel Nevins for pointing this Mishnah out 
to me. The interpretation in square brackets is based on the Tosefta (T.  Makkot 2:2, toward the end).
16 S.A. Yoreh De’ah 259:2 gloss; see also 256:4 gloss.
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itself requests this. The Ramah director and/or someone else he or she deems 
appropriate should offer supportive counseling to Mr. Jones and his family in this 
time of need; after all, this is a family that has been actively involved in supporting 
the camp. As part of this counseling the Ramah representative should raise the 
issue of the named facility, explaining to the Joneses that the primary concern in 
deciding whether to have their name removed or not is to avoid any further shame 
to themselves and their children.  
 In considering the removal of the family name from the Ramah building, 
Mr. Jones and his family should be counseled to consider a number of factors. 
They may want to remove Mr. Jones and his criminal activities from further 
public notice. They may also want to prevent any further embarrassment for his 
children attending camp in future summers, for the name on the building might 
remind them and their friends of the illegal way their father financed his donation 
to build it. For that matter, in light of the fact that adults come up to camp for 
visitors’ day and weekends, they may want to save not only their children, but 
themselves, too, from further embarrassment.17 Because they clearly feel connected 
to Ramah, they may, in addition, want to protect Ramah from any embarrassment. 
Ramah authorities may discuss these ramifications with Mr. Jones and his family 
to explore the best way to maintain the family’s dignity. If Mr. Jones decides that 
Ramah should quietly remove the name to prevent further embarrassment, Ramah 
may do so.  
 No matter what happens to the Jones name on the facility, the community 
has the duty to remember that the Jones family, and even Mr. Jones himself, are 
not fully identified by Mr. Jones’ misdeed(s) and should not be so in the public 
mind. After all, in this particular case and in many like it, Mr. Jones and his family 
have also contributed substantially to charitable institutions, not only in money but 
in time and effort. Thus even if we would condemn the fraud for which Mr. Jones 
has been convicted, and even though we would support whatever the courts decide 
is a fair punishment so that justice is done, we need to be supportive of his family 
and, indeed, of Mr. Jones himself as he and they go through this painful period in 
their lives. Wrongdoers should be punished, but that is the function of the state or 
federal government, not of Ramah.  
 To this point, I have responded to the actual case. For broader application, 
however, I must note that how one rules on this question depends in part on the 
7
17  To his credit, in the 1986 case, Mr. Ivan Boesky asked Chancellor Gerson Cohen to remove the Boesky 
family name from the new library building that his money was helping to construct the morning before he was 
indicted for securities fraud so as not to embarrass the Jewish Theological Seminary.
other grounds that would lead the nonprofit organization to remove a name. For 
example, would it remove the name of donors who did not pay their pledge for this 
building? If so, the level of malfeasance that triggers this action in the community 
that supports this organization is apparently lower than actual crimes, and so 
removing the name may not be as shameful as it would be in other contexts. That 
is, community standards play a role in this decision, especially if they are built into 
contract with major donors.  
 The decision about removing the name also depends critically on the 
level of the crime. The Torah, after all, speaks of the wages of male and female 
prostitutes, and the Talmud speaks of taking money from a thief. What if the crime 
were either less or more serious than the fraud involved in this case?
 Clearly, if Mr. Jones had gotten a parking ticket or had violated the law in 
some other minor way, his name should definitely not be removed from the camp’s 
facility, for his violation of the law does not rise to the level of seriousness that 
should even raise this question. Further, the ease with which Mr. Jones can redeem 
himself from the penalty for such a violation also speaks to the inappropriateness 
of even considering shaming him in this way.  
 On the other hand, if Mr. Jones’s crimes were even more serious than 
they are alleged to be in this specific case – if, for example, he had not only 
committed fraud but also some violent crime, or if his crime involved, as is 
alleged against Agriprocessors, multiple criminal acts that go beyond monetary 
violations (blackmail, immigration and labor violations, etc.), or if, as in the case 
of Bernard Madoff, Mr. Jones were accused only of monetary crimes but to a much 
more extensive degree – then Ramah should think more seriously about taking 
whatever legal steps are necessary to remove his name from the nonprofit’s facility. 
Here it seems that the balance tips in the other direction, where the modeling 
that is involved in publicly honoring someone, and the values of the community 
represented by that modeling, should take precedence over the extra shaming that 
may be involved in removing Mr. Jones’ name from the facility. Moreover, if Mr. 
Jones committed violent or otherwise egregious crimes, the shame he might endure 
by seeing his name removed from the facility pales by comparison to the shame he 
has brought upon himself through the crimes themselves.   
 Where, though, is the line for triggering this response? If it is felonies 
as against misdemeanors, then white-collar felonies, such as the ones Mr. Jones 
committed, should also lead Ramah to seek to remove his name. If only violent 
crimes count, exactly which crimes are we categorizing that way? This is a very 
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slippery slope, and if all crimes disqualified donations, most, if not all, charities 
would cease to exist. Exactly how pure must donated money be, and how would a 
charity know this?
 In the end, then, Ramah and all other charities should either attempt to 
specify in their contracts with major donors the conditions under which they are 
accepting money and offering honors for it or resign themselves, when faced with 
this kind of situation, to being able only to try to convince the donor and/or the 
family to agree to remove their name from the facility they donate. Because of the 
difficulty of specifying such conditions in legal contracts – apart from failing to pay 
one’s full pledge – discussion with the donor(s) is the best way to proceed when 
faced with this question.
After Conviction: Returning Donated Money that Had Already Been Used
  Again supposing that Mr. Jones is convicted of the felony of which he is 
accused, must Ramah return the money the Jones family donated if the camp has 
already used it to build the intended facility?
 Some introductory remarks will help readers understand the rest of this 
responsum. First, in English Common Law and, through it, in American law, 
“theft” is the dishonest appropriation of property with the intention permanently 
to deprive the owner of it; “robbery” is theft with assault; and “burglary” is 
theft with trespass.18 Jewish law similarly distinguishes among forms of theft. 
Specifically, both the Torah and later Rabbinic literature distinguish between 
robbery (gezailah) and burglary (genaivah). As in English Common Law and 
American law, robbery (gezailah) is taking something owned by someone else by 
force; burglary (genaivah) is acquiring someone else’s property through trespass, 
either when the owners are not home or at night.19 According to Jewish law, a 
robber need only return what he robbed, although in cases of embezzlement, false 
oath, or breach of trust, he or she must also pay a 20% fine plus bring a guilt 
offering to the Temple. The penalty for burglary is a 100% fine –that is, the thief 
must pay the owner double what he or she stole – but he or she can escape that fine 
by admitting the burglary, and thus pay the owner only what he or she stole.20 
9
18 I would like to thank Deborah Silver, a British barrister and a rabbinical student at the Ziegler School of 
Rabbinic Studies, for making these distinctions clear to me. 
19 M.T. Laws of Burglary (Genaivah) 1:3; M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss (Gezailah v’Avaidah)1:3.
20 Only the principle for robbery: M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 1:5.  An extra 20% fine and a guilt 
offering if he denied that he robbed: Leviticus 5:24-25.  A thief must pay double: Exodus 22:2-8; however 
if he admitted the theft, he need only pay back the principle: B. Bava Kamma 63b, 64b, 106a; M.T. Laws of 
Burglary 1:4-5.
 This immediately raises a question: why is theft, even with assault, 
punished less than theft with trespass? One might justify the harsher penalty for 
burglary on the basis of the fact that people are more vulnerable at night, and 
therefore the law had to penalize criminals who steal at night more severely to 
deter such crimes. Alternatively, the harsher penalty might be because the
secrecy of the theft made it harder for authorities to identify and catch the thief.  
The Talmud, however, instead explains the difference theologically: the robber 
has no respect for either human or divine law, and thus puts God and human 
beings on an even plane; the burglar, on the other hand, apparently fears human 
legal authorities and therefore steals at night to hide from them, but in stealing he 
violates God’s law, and so he respects God less than human beings and therefore 
must be more severely punished for both his legal and theological violations.21 Like
other biblical fines and penalties, already in Talmudic times these fines for burglary 
fell into desuetude because the rabbis of that time did not think that they had 
the jurisdiction to adjudicate fines after the demise of the Sanhedrin in 361 C.E. 
brought an end to the chain of judicial authorization,22 and so in practice both 
robbers and burglars need to return only what they stole.  
 Although the Torah requires that a thief return the exact object that he 
took – “he restores that which he robbed” (Leviticus 5:23) – the Rabbis enacted 
a change to encourage thieves to repent (takkanat ha-shavim), such that thieves 
who changed a stolen object permanently need only repay the monetary value of 
what they took rather than the object itself, and they pay only what it was worth 
at the time of the theft.23 The Rabbis did this, no doubt, because they wanted to 
encourage the thief both to change his ways and to compensate the victim, for they 
saw the law as functioning not only to punish wrongdoers but to move them to 
become law-abiding and moral people. This is one example of a broader feature of 
Jewish law, which sees the purpose of criminal justice not so much as retribution 
but as compensation of the victim, repair of the rift in the communal fabric, and 
rehabilitation of the criminal.24   
 In addition, the Rabbis instituted takkanat ha-shuk, the enactment of the 
market, according to which a person who acquired something not knowing that it 
21 Mekhilta, “Mishpatim,” Chapter 15; B. Bava Kamma 79b.
22 B. Bava Kamma 84a-b; see also B. Bava Kamma 27b and B. Sanhedrin 13b-14a. 
23 B. Gittin 55a; B. Bava Kamma 66a-b, 94a-b; M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 2:1-2
24 For more on this, see Elliot N. Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself: A Jewish Approach to Modern 
Personal Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003), pp. 207-230 and pp. 337-344; and Elliot N. 
Dorff, For the Love of God and People: A Theory of Jewish Law (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
2007), pp. 212-222.
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was stolen need not give the original owner either the property or its value unless 
the seller was a known thief.25 They instituted this rule “because otherwise no 
person would purchase anything, for fear that it had been stolen.”26
 Now, then, let us address our question. The Prophets warn us repeatedly 
against complicity in illegal actions and their financial earnings. Amos, chronologi-
cally the very first of the literary prophets of the Bible, already sets the tone: 
 Listen to this, you who devour the needy, annihilating the poor of the 
 land, saying, “If only the new moon were over so that we could sell 
 grain, the sabbath, so that we could offer wheat for sale, using an 
 ephah [a dry measure] that is too small and a shekel that is too big, 
 tilting a dishonest scale and selling grain refuse as grain! We will buy 
 the poor for silver, the needy for a pair of sandals.” The Lord swears 
 by the Pride of Jacob: “I will never forget any of their doings.” Shall 
 not the earth shake for this and all that dwell on it mourn? ...27
Furthermore, Deuteronomy 23:19 specifically forbids us from accepting for the 
Temple any donation whose source is ill-gotten – in its specific case, the wages  
of a harlot.  
 You shall not bring the fee of a whore or the pay of a dog [= a male
 prostitute] into the house of the Lord your God in fulfillment of any 
 vow, for both are abhorrent to the Lord your God.
The Talmud and the codes then make it clear that it is forbidden – “a great sin” 
– to acquire stolen property from a burglar or robber:
 It is forbidden to acquire from a burglar the object that he stole, and 
 it is a great sin [to do so], for that strengthens the hands of those who
 violate the law and causes him to steal other things, for if he would 
 find no buyer, he would not steal, and on this Scripture says,  “He 
 who shares with a thief is his own enemy” (Proverbs 29:24).28
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25 M. Bava Kamma 10:3; B. Bava Kamma 115a (and see Rashi there, s.v. takkanat ha-shuk); M.T. Laws of 
Burglary 5:2-3 (cited and translated below); M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss  5:7. The standard in American 
law for similar cases is whether you have reason to believe that the seller is a thief, which is a weaker standard 
and thus one that makes buyers more responsible for knowing whether the sale is legitimate – and therefore 
more responsible also to return the money or object to the rightful owner if it later turns out that the seller was 
indeed a thief. This may be based on the view of many modern economists that fear of an item being stolen 
decreases the value of every item on the market (because buyers will pay less for any item that may be stolen 
and that they therefore might  have to be return), but this fear would not block market transactions altogether. 
Normally, Jews think of Jewish law as more demanding than secular law, given that Jewish law is a religious 
legal system with deep roots in morality, in contrast to secular law whose primary purpose is to establish rules 
to ensure order. (On this, see Elliot N. Dorff, For the Love of Law and People: A Philosophy of Jewish Law 
[Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2007], Chapter Six.)  Here, though, the judgment of Jewish law is 
that the market requires that the thief actually be well-known (literally, “famous” as a thief) for a sale to be 
overturned. I want to thank Professors Robert Katz and David Orentlicher of the Indiana University School of 
Law, Indianapolis, for pointing this out to me.
26 Shakh, S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 356, subpar. 4.  Arukh Ha-Shulhah, Hoshen Mishpat 356:2 states the same 
reason for this enactment.
27 Amos 8:4-8. For other examples of prophets admonishing the Israelites about their business ethics, see Isaiah 
26:8-10; Jeremiah 9:3-8; 21:12-14; Micah 3:9-12; and, perhaps most famously, 6:8.
28 M.T. Laws of Burglary 5:1; see also S.A. Hoshen Mispat 356:1. 
 It is forbidden to acquire anything robbed from the robber, and it is
 forbidden to help him change it so that he may legally acquire it, for
 anyone who does these things or anything similar strengthens the 
 hands of transgressors and violates [the Torah’s law], “Before a blind
 person do not put a stumbling block” (Leviticus 19:14).29
Based on such sources, some might plausibly argue that Ramah should take the 
high moral road of returning the money that the Jones Family donated so that 
Ramah is not tainted in any way by Mr. Jones’ illegal actions.
 Ramah may choose to do this, even if it requires a major effort to replace 
the money that the Jones family donated. In making this choice, however, it must 
weigh several factors, including how much money it would need to raise to return 
the Jones family gift, the degree of difficulty of raising this amount of money, 
the other projects or programs that would suffer as a result of having to use this 
money for reimbursing the Jones family, the amount of negative publicity that 
would accompany the return of this money, and the degree to which other donors 
would themselves support such a move or object to it.    
 Although the Ramah Board of Directors may, upon taking all these factors 
into consideration, choose to return the money to the Jones family that was used 
to build the building that bears their name, Jewish law does not require it to do 
so. Ramah accepted the Jones money without knowing that it was ill-gotten gain; 
it therefore has the protection of takkanat ha-shuk, the enactment of the market, 
and need not return anything to either Mr. Jones or the people from whom he 
stole (assuming that they could be identified). Indeed, as Rabbi Ben Zion Bergman 
pointed out to me, the same logic that moved the Rabbis to institute takkanat ha-
shuk to enable people to trust that they will not have to part with what they buy 
innocently in the market applies to charities just as well and perhaps even more. 
After all, given the complexities of today’s market, with its manifold opportunities 
for individual malfeasance and for corporate wrongdoing, as reported all too 
often in the news, if Jewish law required returning ill-gotten donations when the 
charity had no reason to suspect that they were illegally procured, “that would 
put an onerous burden on every communal institution to question whether any 
major gift was pure as the driven snow, lest they have to return it later…Therefore, 
considering that it is in society’s best interest to encourage charitable institutions 
and to facilitate their efficient operation, requiring the return of a charitable 
29 M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 5:1; see also S.A. Hoshen Mispat 369:1.  All four of the citations in this 
note and the previous one are based on B. Bava Kamma 118b-119a.
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contribution of questionable provenance would be highly detrimental to the  
public interest.”30 
 Moreover, Ramah has already used the money Mr. Jones donated to finance 
the building bearing the Jones name. There has thus been a change in the nature of 
the gift from money to a building, and a shinnuy ma’aseh (a change in form that is 
irretrievable) confers ownership on the thief.31 Maimonides summarizes the law thus: 
 Anyone who robs [something] is required to return the robbed object 
 itself, as the Torah says, “And he would restore that which he got 
 through robbery” (Leviticus 5:23); but if it was lost or changed, he 
 pays its worth.  Whether he admitted on his own [that he robbed it] 
 or witnesses testified against him that he robbed, he is required to pay 
 only the principle. Even if he robbed a beam and built it into a palace,
 because it was not changed, according to the law of the Torah he must
 destroy the whole building and return the beam to its owners. The 
 Sages, however, changed the law (tikknu) as an enactment for those 
 who repent [takkanat ha-shavim] that he [the robber] should give [the
 beam’s owner] its worth [in money] and not lose the building, and 
 likewise with all similar cases. Even if he robbed a beam and made it
 part of his hut (sukkah) for the holiday [of Sukkot, when all such huts 
 are to be temporary], and the owner came to claim it during the 
 Festival, he need give him only the money it is worth, but after the 
 Festival, because the beam was not changed and he did not build it 
 into the hut with mortar, he must return the beam itself….
 A robbed object that was not changed but remains as it was, even if 
 the owners despaired [of getting it back] and even if the robber died 
 and it is now in the hands of his sons, it itself must be returned to its
 owners. If, however, it was changed by the robber, even if the owners 
 had not yet despaired of recovering it, he [the robber] acquired it 
 through the change and he must pay its worth [to the owners] as of 
 the time of the robbery.
 This is the Torah’s law, and it says, “And he would return that which 
 he got through robbery” (Leviticus 5:23). From the oral tradition, 
 however, we have learned that if it is as it was when he robbed it, then
 he returns it, but if it was changed by him, he must pay its worth…
 And this is the Sages’ words because of their enactment for those who
 repent [takkanat ha-shavim]…
 A change that returns to its original state is not [for these purposes
 considered] a change.  How so?  If he robbed pieces of wood and 
 stuck them together with nails and made a box with them, that is not 
 a change because he can break them [the boards of the box] apart and 
 they become the boards that they were before.
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29 M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 5:1; see also S.A. Hoshen Mispat 369:1.  All four of the citations in this 
note and the previous one are based on B. Bava Kamma 118b-119a.
30 Rabbi Ben Zion Bergman, in an e-mail to me dated October 27, 2008.
31 B. Bava Kamma 66a, 93b.
 If he robbed dirt and made it a brick, he has not acquired it because 
 if he smashes the brick the dirt will return to the way it was. If he 
 robbed a tongue of metal and made it a coin, he has not acquired it, 
 for if he melts the coin, it will return to the tongue [of metal] that it 
 was. And the same is true for all similar things.
 But if he robbed pieces of wood and burned them or cut them or 
 carved into them and made them vessels, or he robbed wool and 
 dyed it or stripped it clean or bleached it, or he robbed thread and 
 made clothing of it, or he robbed a brick and made it dirt, or stones 
 and he polished them or coins and he melted them, that is a change 
 by his hand, for if he were to make them other coins, they would   
 have a different face. And the same is true for similar cases [of 
 permanent change].32   
Notice that, as Maimonides stated, the reason that change of form confers 
ownership is to encourage the thief to repent for his thievery; it is consequently 
called takkanat ha-shavim, “the enactment for those who repent.” One might 
imagine other reasons for this rule. For example, in John Locke’s analysis of 
ownership, a person who mixes his or her labor with some item increases its value 
and so is entitled to some part of it, possibly even if the person acquired the item 
originally through theft. Alternatively, on utilitarian grounds, it would be socially 
wasteful to tear down the house to get the beam back, and that might justify 
permitting the thief to return the beam’s value in money rather than the beam 
itself. Jewish law includes this provision, however, not for either of these reasons 
but rather specifically to encourage repentance. This illustrates the moral concerns 
that pervade Jewish law, especially, but not exclusively, in areas of business.33 
 If a permanent change confers ownership on a thief, it presumably has even 
greater power to transfer ownership to an innocent recipient of the stolen assets 
who permanently changes the form of what was stolen – in this case, Ramah, 
which changed Mr. Jones’ money into a building. Thus Ramah owns the building, 
and, contrary to the thief, Ramah has no obligations to the people Mr. Jones 
defrauded to pay them back. Mr. Jones has the duty to restore to his victims the 
32 M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 1:5, 2:1-2, 10-12. See also S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 360:5-6. There is a Tosefta 
(T. Bava Kamma 10:12), recorded in an expanded form in the Talmud (B. Bava Metzia 21b-22a) that says that 
“A burglar (ganav) who stole from one person and gave to another, and similarly a robber (gazlan) who took 
from one person and gave to another, and similarly the Jordan River that took from one person and gave to 
another, what he took, he took, and what he gave, he gave,” presumably even without a change in form, on 
the grounds, apparently, that owners despair of getting any stolen thing back, but the codes did not follow this 
position. 
33 I would like to thank Professor Robert Katz of the Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, for 
suggesting these alternative grounds to me. For Locke’s theory, see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 
(1690), Peter Laslett, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960). For an overview of theories of 
property, see Stanley I. Benn, “Property,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 6:491-494. That Jewish law is 
especially concerned with the morality of business is evident in the Talmud’s claim that the very first question 
that a person is asked by God after death is “Did you engage in business honestly?” (B. Shabbat 31a). 
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money he stole from them, as described by Maimonides above, but Ramah, as an 
innocent recipient of his money, does not have that duty.  
 In fact, in the specific case, Mr. Jones defrauded the government and 
therefore cannot really identify the specific individuals who are hurt by his actions. 
In such cases, the specific way that Jewish law provides for him to compensate his 
unknown victims is to contribute to a public charity like Ramah:
 The form of return (repentance, teshuvah) for shepherds, charity 
 collectors, and tax collectors is difficult because they stole from the 
 public, and they do not know to whom to return [what they stole].
 Therefore they should do with it [what they stole] public works, like 
 wells, ditches, and caves.34   
 In light of this, some might rightfully object to Ramah using other money 
to reimburse the Jones family on the grounds that Ramah should not waste any 
money it collects and desperately needs for its sacred purposes on something like 
this, particularly when Jewish law specifically provides that Ramah has no duty to 
return it and may actually undermine Mr. Jones’ ability to repent if it does so.  
That is, some might argue that what appears to be the high moral road is not that 
after all but rather an irresponsible use of money donated by others.
After Conviction: Returning Donated Money that Had Not Yet Been Used
 Again assuming that Mr. Jones is ultimately convicted of the crimes for 
which he now stands indicted, what if some of the money that the Jones family 
contributed has not yet been used for the costs of completing or furnishing the 
building that bears their name or for any other Ramah project or program? Must 
Ramah return that money? After all, unlike the money that has already been used 
toward the construction of the building, this money has not undergone a change 
in form; it is still money. Thus the laws cited in the previous section invoking a 
change in form do not apply and cannot justify Ramah holding on to the money.
 Of the three parties in the case – the original owners, the thief, and the 
buyer (or the receiver of a gift) – the thief is the one with presumably the least 
money and therefore the least likely to be able to pay a judgment against him.  
Thus in the laws described below, the party that has to claim against the thief is at 
a real disadvantage, for the thief may not be able to pay what he owes. 
 Mr. Jones was not a “known thief” (ganav me’fursam) before the recent 
accusations. If he were, the enactment of the market would not apply, and thus a 
change of possession would not effect a transfer of ownership. Thus Ramah would 
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34 B. Bava Kamma 94b; S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 366:2.
have to give the money back to its original owners (in this case, the government) 
and seek to force Mr Jones to make good on his pledge:
 If someone steals and sells [something] and the original owners did 
 not despair [of recovering it], and afterward the thief was identified 
 and witnesses testified that the object that So-and-So [the thief] sold 
 is what he stole in front of us, the object returns to its original owners, 
 and the owners give to the buyer the money that he paid the thief due 
 to the enactment of the market (takkanat ha-shuk), and the owners 
 then have to claim in court against the thief [the money that they had 
 to pay to the buyer].  If, however, he was a known thief, the Rabbis 
 did not apply the enactment of the market, and the owners give 
 nothing to the buyer but rather the buyer must claim in court against 
 the thief [the money he paid the thief] and extract from him the money 
 that he [the thief] took for it.35  
 In our case, however, Mr. Jones was not a known thief, and the enactment of 
the market applies. That is, as explained earlier, to engender security in the market, 
the Rabbis ruled that a buyer who did not know that the seller was a thief can get 
his money back from the original owners when he returns the object, and the owners 
have to take the thief to court for the money they had to pay the buyer. That is, 
Jewish law provides that even without a change in form, if a thief or robber sold or 
gave the stolen object or money to a third party who did not have reason to suspect 
that it was stolen, the exchange of the property (shinnuy reshut) – that is, the change 
of possession – together with the owners’ despair of getting it back is sufficient to 
confer ownership on the buyer or recipient.  Maimonides states the law with regard 
to burglary as follows, and Joseph Caro quotes him almost verbatim: 
 If the owner abandons hope of recovering the stolen article, whether 
 he first abandons hope and then the thief sells it, or he abandons hope 
 after the thief has sold it, the purchaser acquires title to it as a result 
 of the change in possession and the owner’s abandonment of hope of
 recovery, and the purchaser need not return the stolen property itself 
 to the owner.  If the purchaser bought it from a notorious thief, he 
 must give the owner its value; but if the seller was not a notorious 
 thief, the purchaser gives the owner nothing.36  
As the Shulhan Arukh makes clear, the same rule applies to robbery:
 If the robber had sold it or given it away as a gift, even though the 
 robbed object had not changed, it itself does not return from the hand 
 of the buyer because the owners have despaired [of getting it back],
 whether before the sale or gift or after the sale or gift; the buyer has
 acquired it through [the owners’] despair and the change of possession.37
35 M.T. Laws of  Burglary 5:2.  
36 M.T. Laws of Burglary (Genaivah) 2:3; S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 356:3.  Maimonides is getting his distinction 
about acquiring from a notorious thief as opposed to anyone else from the Talmud’s discussion of Hanan the 
Scoundrel; see B. Bava Kamma 115a.  
37 S. A. Hoshen Mispat 362:3.  
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With regard to both burglary and robbery, the Tur (Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, 1270-
1340, Germany and then Spain), in the name of his father, the Rosh (Rabbenu 
Asher ben Yehiel, c. 1250-1327, Germany and then Spain) and the Rema (R. 
Moses Isserles, c.1525-1572, Poland) disagree with Maimonides and Rabbi Caro 
in that the Rosh and the Rema require that the owners’ despair of retrieving 
their object come before the change in possession to make it legally effective to 
transfer ownership38; but both Maimonides and Caro, as quoted above, take the 
more lenient position, maintaining that even if the owners despair of retrieving 
their property only after the change of possession, that is enough to transfer 
possession.39
 One contemporary case in which the purchaser would not acquire 
ownership under either of these interpretations of Jewish law is that of artwork 
stolen by the Nazis and then acquired from them, sometimes in a series of 
purchases after World War II. As we are seeing increasingly, international law 
agrees with Jewish law on this: because the original owners – or their descendants 
– may not have even known about their ancestors’ possessions and certainly did 
not despair of recovering them, purchasers must return the artwork to the original 
owners or their heirs.
 Ramah did not buy anything from Mr. Jones; it received money from him 
as a gift.  Nevertheless, as the Shulhah Arukh specifies, the same law applies, for 
both selling and gifting confer ownership on the receiver, assuming that the original 
owners despaired of getting their money or object back.40 In Genesis 23, Abraham 
is careful to purchase the cave of Makhpelah to bury Sarah rather than acquire 
it as a gift, presumably because he thinks that purchasing confers a stronger hold 
on an acquisition than receiving it as a gift does, and I am told that American law 
makes the same distinction. As the paragraphs quoted here indicate, however, in 
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38 Tur, Hoshen Mispat 353:9; S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 356:3, gloss.  
39 This is a debate that begins in the Talmud: B. Bava Kamma 115a.  Notice that although generally change of 
possession coupled with the owner’s despair effects a transfer of ownership, there are some exceptions.  The 
Rabbis treated property encumbered to a daughter for her dowry or to a wife for her ketubbah as special 
cases, such that changing possession (shinnuy reshut) does not effect a change of ownership, even with despair.  
Specifically, (1) “Dowry may be seized from encumbered properties”; that is, the right of a daughter to a 
dowry creates a lien on the real property of her father’s estate, and so even if his heirs had sold the property, 
the orphan daughter may collect her dowry from it (B. Ketubbot 69a; B. Gittin 50b; M.T. Laws of Marriage 
20:7; Laws of Lending 18:1; S.A. Even Ha-Ezer 113:5).  (2) If a husband designated a specific piece of property 
as the collateral for his wife’s ketubbah but subsequently sold it, she can recover that piece of property with 
an oath and need not accept either cash or equivalent property in exchange (M. Ketubbot 9:8 [middle of the 
Mishnah, 87a]; see also B. Ketubbot 51a [bottom] and Rashi, s.v. ahra’in le’ketubbateikh hayyav); M.T. Laws 
of Marriage 16:20; M.T. Laws of Lending 22:10; S.A. Even Ha-Ezer 96:9 and S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 98:9, 
114:4.  (3) If a husband sold any of his wife’s real estate during their marriage, the sale is void because he at 
most has rights of usufruct but not of ownership (B. Bava Batra 50a; M.T. Laws of Marriage 22:15; S.A. Even 
Ha-Ezer 90:13, 16).  
40 S. A. Hoshen Mishpat 353:3-4.  
Jewish law takkanat ha-shuk applies to donations as well as to purchases, and 
Ramah need not return the donation, whether Ramah acquired it through purchase 
or as a gift.
 The question here, then, is whether the owners despaired of getting their 
money back. In the specific case, it was the government that Mr. Jones defrauded, 
and the government clearly did not despair in recovering its money because it 
prosecuted Mr. Jones with the intention of both punishing him and also recovering 
what it could. In the plea bargain that Mr. Jones reached with the government, 
however, the government settled both its criminal and civil suits against him. Thus 
the government has either recovered the money he stole or agreed to forego it 
as part of the plea agreement. In the former case, the money Mr. Jones donated 
was not stolen but rather came from other assets of his; in the latter case, the 
government has despaired of recovering its money. Thus Ramah has acquired the 
money Mr. Jones donated either as a legitimate gift from legitimately earned funds 
or through despair (ya’ush) and transfer of property (shinnuy reshut). 
 If the government were the only aggrieved party, Ramah would not need 
to return any money it received from Mr. Jones once the government settled its 
civil case with him. In cases such as this, though, prosecution by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission is often followed by civil suits filed by individual 
stockholders or other aggrieved parties, such as employees and those with whom 
the accused party contracted for goods or services. Thus Ramah would have full 
possession of the donated money not yet spent through the combination of transfer 
of possession and despair of the owners only when both the government’s case has 
been settled and the maximum time under the statute of limitations has run out 
for individual stockholders or other aggrieved parties to file civil suits against Mr. 
Jones. That is, despair (ya’ush) can be assumed only when both the government’s 
case has been settled and when individuals no longer can file civil suits against Mr. 
Jones. This would have the practical effect of preventing Ramah from benefiting 
from any of the unused funds that Mr. Jones donated until a substantial period of 
time had passed.41 
 In other cases, the non-profit institution would have to examine the 
following:  (a) if the donor was a known thief, the institution should not have 
taken a donation from him or her in the first place and, if it did, it must now return 
that money to its rightful owners; (b) if the donor was not a known thief at the 
time of the donation and the donation did not change form permanently so as to 
41 I would like to thank Dr. Neil Spingarn, of Rabbi Elie Spitz’s congregation, for pointing this out to me. 
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qualify as a permanent change (shinnuy ma’aseh), the institution must determine 
whether the original owners despaired, or could legitimately be assumed to have 
despaired, of retrieving their money or object, whether before or after it was 
transferred to the possession of the non-profit institution. If they did despair (that 
is, if there was ya’ush as well as transfer of possession to the nonprofit institution), 
then the institution may keep it; if not, the institution must return it. The difficulty 
of  meeting this requirement – that is, of demonstrating that the original owner 
despaired of recouping his or her losses – may give charities incentive to spend 
donated money rather than keep it in the bank, where it is essentially held 
conditionally, subject to disgorgement if found to be tainted.42
After Conviction: Accepting Further Donations 
from Mr. Jones or the Jones Family 
 Again assuming that Mr. Jones is ultimately convicted of the crimes for 
which he now stands indicted, what if the Jones family offers to donate more 
money to Ramah? What if Mr. Jones himself, after paying the compensation and 
fines and/or serving the prison sentence the court imposes now wants to donate 
further money to Ramah? May Ramah accept such donations?
 As noted above, according to Jewish law, once a person is known to be a 
thief, people may not buy from him or her or accept any further gifts from him or 
her.43 The Rabbis instituted this prohibition lest buyers from the thief or recipients 
of gifts from him or her thereby induce the thief to steal more; they then would 
be violating Leviticus 19:14, “Do not put a stumbling block before a blind man,” 
which the Rabbis understood to mean not only physically blind, but morally blind 
as well.44  So assuming that Mr. Jones is convicted, any future gifts by him must  
be declined.45 
 There is one exception to this rule, however. If Mr. Jones specifically and 
publicly indicates that in addition to the compensation, fines, and/or the prison 
sentence the court imposed, he wants to donate more money to Ramah as a form 
of teshuvah, of return to proper conduct and the good graces of God and the 
Jewish community, Ramah may accept such a donation if it has good reason to 
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42 I would like to thank Professor Robert Katz of the Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, for 
pointing this last point out to me.
43 M. T. Laws of Burglary, 5:1, 7-9; S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 356:1.
44 B. Pesahim 22b; B. Mo’ed Katan 17a; B. Kiddushin 32b; B. Nedarim 62b; B. Bava Metzia 5b, 75b. See also 
B. Avodah Zarah 6b and 22a, where it is applied to the theologically blind – i.e., those who worship idols.
45 On this topic generally, see my article, “Nonprofits and Morals: Jewish Perspectives and Methods for 
Resolving Some Commonly Occurring Moral Issues,” in David H. Smith, ed., Good Intentions: Moral 
Obstacles and Opportunities (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 103-126.
believe that Mr. Jones legally earned the money it is now getting and is genuinely 
engaged in the process of teshuvah. His intentions, of course, are difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine.  As a result, people might presume that Mr. Jones is just 
trying to buy back respectability, and they might say that Ramah should not be 
the vehicle to enable him to do that. Still, one must judge one’s fellow’s intentions 
favorably,46 especially when they are accompanied by good deeds, and so if 
Ramah can be assured that the new money was legitimately earned, it may accept 
additional donations from him as part of his teshuvah.  Further, as noted above, it 
may definitely take the money if the victims of Mr. Jones’ thievery are not known, 
for then the way that Jewish law would have him compensate his unknown victims 
is by contributing to a public charity.47  The Jewish tradition believes strongly in 
the need for, and the power of, return (teshuvah).48   
 Even so, one may not do anything to entice a transgressor to repeat the 
transgression for fear of putting a stumbling block before the blind in violation 
of Leviticus 19:14.  Thus after serving a prison sentence and fulfilling the other 
requirements of teshuvah, a pedophile, for example, may not be entrusted with 
leading a youth group.  Even though Jewish law maintains that one can fulfill 
all the requirements of return only by ultimately acting differently in the same 
situation, we may not expose children to the risk of such a process, and so 
pedophiles can take many of the steps of return but cannot complete the process.49  
46 M. Avot 1:6; see also 6:6.
47 See note 34 above.
48 M.T. Laws of Return (teshuvah) Chapters 1 and 2 generally, and 3:14 for the power of teshuvah even to 
erase the penalty of egregious sins that deprive a person of a place in the World to Come.  For a general 
description of the nature, scope, and power of these laws, see Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself (at note 
23 above), Chapter Six. 
    The Jewish tradition believes so much in the importance and power of teshuvah that if Mr. Jones had come 
forward on his own to admit his crimes, rather than being convicted in a court, and if the stolen money or 
object no longer exists, Jewish law requires that we not accept his offer to pay for what he stole from his own 
assets for fear of dissuading others from admitting their crimes lest they lose everything they own.  Instead “we 
must help him [to fulfill the requirements of teshuvah] and forgive him so as to make the right path accessible 
to those who are repentant; and anyone who takes back from him the money of the theft, the spirit of the 
Sages is not pleased with such a person.”  (M.T. Laws of Burglary and Loss 1:13, based on B. Bava Kamma 
94b; see also M.T. Laws of the Lender and Borrower 4:5; S.A. Hoshen Mishpat 366:1).  
    In sum, then, (1) If the stolen property exists, the thief must return it, and we accept it from the thief even if 
that person engages in a process of teshuvah. (2) If the stolen property exists, but the thief would suffer great 
loss in returning it (for example, a beam that he built into a building, where there has been a change of form), 
the thief instead pays the worth of what he or she stole and not the actual object itself because of the Rabbis’ 
enactment for those who repent (takkanat ha-shavim). (3) If the stolen property no longer exists and the thief 
comes on his own to admit his crime, we do not accept from him his own money or other assets to compensate 
the victim so as to encourage those who do wrong to engage in teshuvah. (4) If the stolen property no longer 
exists and the thief did not come on his own to admit his crime but rather was convicted in court, the thief 
must pay for what he stole from his own assets.
49 See Elliot N. Dorff, “Family Violence,” www.rabbinicalassembly.org, under the link, “Contemporary 
Halakhah”; printed in Kassel Abelson and David J. Fine, eds., Responsa 1991-2000 of the Committee on 
Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement (New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 2002), pp. 773-
816, esp. pp. 808-811; and in Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself (at note 24 above), Chapter Five, esp. 
pp. 196-200. 
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Here, however, if, for example, the court barred Mr. Jones from earning money 
in the way he previously did and he now earns a living in a completely different 
way, and if one can reasonably be assured that the new gift comes from his new, 
legitimately procured funds, one may accept it as the act of return that he needs 
and intends. Mr. Jones’ status as a convicted and therefore  known thief (a ganav 
mefursam), however, shifts the burden of proof: although ordinarily a charity 
may assume that donations to it have been legitimately earned, if a convicted 
thief wants to donate to the charity, it must examine the source of the money to 
determine that it was legitimately earned.  
 The situation is more complicated if the Jones family wishes to donate 
more money to Ramah. That is permissible in either of two ways. (1) If, before 
conviction, Mr. Jones transferred money to other members of  the family who 
did not know that it was earned illegally, thus making that money the separate 
property of other family members, then the change in ownership from the thief to 
innocent and unknowing parties conveys ownership to them if the original owners 
despaired of recovering it or are unknown, according to the principle discussed 
above that a change of possession (shinui reshut) together with despair of the 
owners (ya-ush ba’alim) has that power. The other family members may therefore 
now use some or all of the money Mr. Jones gave them to make a donation. 
 (2) The other situation in which Ramah may take Jones family money is 
if it can be shown that only a minority of the money comes from Mr. Jones and it 
is not known whether that portion was stolen or not. As Maimonides states the 
Talmudic law: 
 It is forbidden to benefit from a robber.  But if the minority was his, 
 then even though most of his money is robbed, it is permitted to 
 benefit from him until (and unless) one knows for certain that this 
 thing in his hand is robbed.50
Rulings (Peskei Halakhah):
1.  Indictment vs. conviction. Until and unless Mr. Jones is convicted, Jews 
individually and collectively must think and act toward him on the strong 
presumption in American law and the even stronger presumption in Jewish law that 
he is innocent. To do otherwise would violate the ban on slander (motzi shem ra).
2.  Names on facilities. Even if Mr. Jones is convicted, either through his own 
confession or through a finding of the court, unless his family specifically requests 
that their name be removed from the facility that they donated, Ramah should not 
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50 M.T. Laws of Robbery and Loss 5:8; based on B. Bava Kamma 119a.
remove their name. To do so would actually violate Jewish laws prohibiting public 
embarrassment of innocent family members.  
 If the building is named solely for Mr. Jones, whether to remove his name 
depends in part on community standards. What, besides crimes, would lead the 
nonprofit to remove the names of donors? The answer to this question affects the 
amount of shame involved in doing it in this instance.
 The acceptability or desirability of removing Mr. Jones’ name also depends 
on the level of his crime. This particular case is a middle ground where judgment 
is required.  If Mr. Jones had violated the law in a much less serious way, then the 
question of shaming him by removing his name from the facility should not even 
arise. If, on the other hand, Mr. Jones had committed a violent crime, multiple 
crimes involving the oppression of individuals and society in general, or much 
more extensive fraud than Mr. Jones is alleged to have committed in this specific 
case, then Ramah or any other nonprofit organization should remove his name 
from the facility so that people do not think that the nonprofit honors the kinds of 
acts that Mr. Jones committed.  
 In any case, the community has a duty to give emotional and other forms 
of support to the innocent members of Mr. Jones’ family and even to Mr. Jones 
himself as they go through this painful period in their lives, for they are, after 
all, members of our community—indeed active and contributing members—who 
should be thought of not solely for the crime that Mr. Jones committed but also for 
the good that he and his family have done.  
3.  Money already used. Even if Mr. Jones is convicted of the crimes for which he 
is now indicted, Ramah need not return the money that had already been used to 
erect the building that bears the family’s name because a permanent change of form 
and despair of the original owners have occurred. In other cases, the nonprofit 
institution must determine whether both elements have occurred in order to be 
legally entitled on these grounds to keep the money or objects donated.
4.  Money not yet used. Again, even if Mr. Jones is convicted of the crimes for 
which he is now indicted, Ramah need not return the money the family donated 
that had not yet been used on the grounds of a transfer of possession together with 
the owners’ despair of retrieving their property once both the government and 
all aggrieved parties have settled their cases with him or the statute of limitations 
has run out for any aggrieved parties to file further civil suits. In other cases, the 
nonprofit institution must determine whether both of these elements have occurred 
to determine whether the non-profit organization is legally entitled on these 
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grounds to keep the money or the objects donated on the grounds of both transfer of 
possession (shinnui reshut) and despair (ya’ush).  If both transfer of possession and 
the owner’s despair have occurred, they make keep it; if not, they must return it.
5.  Accepting further donations from Mr. Jones. If Mr. Jones is convicted of what 
he is accused of doing, Ramah may not accept any more money from him unless 
(a) Mr. Jones has publicly specified that in addition to the compensation, fines, 
and/or prison time the court imposed he wants to make this further donation as 
part of his process of teshuvah and (b) Ramah can determine that he earned the 
new money legitimately.  Generally, a nonprofit may assume that donations to it 
are legally earned, but if the individual is “a known thief,” as Mr. Jones is once 
he was convicted of fraud, Ramah or any other nonprofit must take these extra 
precautions in order to receive further donations from him in accordance with 
Jewish law.
6.  Accepting further donations from the Jones family. If the Jones family offers to 
donate more money to Ramah, the camp may accept it if either (a) the assets were 
transferred before Mr. Jones’ conviction to his family members, who received them 
with no knowledge that they were the fruit of illegal activities (i.e., there had been 
a change of ownership, a shinnuy reshut, to innocent parties before the indictment) 
and the original owners had despaired of retrieving their property (ya’ush), along 
the lines defined in ruling (4) above; or (b) the assets of Mr. Jones himself are a 
minority of what the Jones family is contributing and it is not known whether his 
portion was stolen or not.  
7.  Protecting the reputation of the nonprofit agency. Even though it is legally 
permissible to act in the ways described in (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), if Mr. Jones 
is convicted of the crimes for which he has been indicted, the Ramah Board may 
decide that it is in the camp’s best interests to return the money it received from 
the Jones family or to refuse to accept any more money from them, just as it 
may decide to accept or reject any other proposed gift from anyone else.  Likely 
considerations in this judgment – although not the only possible ones – are 
the level of Mr. Jones’ crime; the extent to which keeping the Jones’ gifts will 
undermine the mission, values, or reputation of the nonprofit; and the likelihood 
that keeping the Jones’ gifts will deter future donations from others.     
 These conclusions apply not only to Camp Ramah, but also to any 
Jewish communal institution, including synagogues, schools, federations, social 
service agencies, and national or international organizations, such as the United 
Synagogue of Conservative Judaism and the Rabbinical Assembly.
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Epilogue
 Now that we have seen at least one interpretation of how Jewish law would 
respond to the questions posed in this paper, it would be enlightening to compare 
its responses to those of other ethical systems, if only to show that the way Jewish 
law treats these issues is not obvious. To do that thoroughly would require a 
completely new paper, but a few short examples will demonstrate some of the ways 
in which a Jewish legal treatment of moral issues might differ from other ways of 
approaching them.
 Although thinkers might well differ as to how each of the main ethical 
theories in Western thought might resolve the questions raised in this essay, 
utilitarians would seek to determine what is the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people. In line with this tenet, they might argue that the good of society 
is best served by having a plethora of nonprofit organizations that help society 
achieve important social, educational, and cultural goals, and so we should simply 
say that any money donated to a nonprofit belongs to it, regardless of how it 
was earned.  We might still punish monetary crimes in order to deter fraud in the 
future, but we should not undermine nonprofits by paying too much attention to 
the sources of their income.  
 That is at least one possible reading of how utilitarians might respond to 
our questions. It would share with Jewish law an interest in protecting buyers or 
receivers of gifts from having to return property that, unbeknownst to them, did 
not legitimately belong to the seller or donor, but it would differ from Jewish law 
in judging all these questions in terms of the communal good.
 The opposite would probably be true for the way in which my Jewish legal 
analysis would relate to a deontological ethic, such as those of Immanuel Kant 
or W. D. Ross. For them, moral principles and intentions are the most important 
factors in evaluating the morality of an act, even if terrible consequences result.  
So a thoroughgoing deontologist might say that nonprofits must thoroughly 
investigate the sources of all donations, rejecting not only those that were stolen 
outright but even those that were morally tainted in other ways, such as being the 
profit of  sweatshops.  
 Jewish law would take a position in between these two extremes, 
recognizing the pragmatic need to assure buyers and nonprofits that their 
acquisitions are secure while also worrying that theft not be condoned or 
rewarded.  It is precisely because Judaism uses law and not overarching formulas 
or principles that it can make fine distinctions among various actions, approving 
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some and disapproving others. Because Jewish law is largely a case-based system 
rather than a code-based one, it can focus on the nuances of the questions involved 
in the specific situations that raise moral questions. Because Jewish law is a 
religious legal system, it can call us to a higher moral plane than we might reach if 
left on our own, teaching us norms that are realistic while enabling us to be more 
like God.            
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